

June 85

Plans are for "FS" (misnomer)

and FS means city-busting!

("not pop" - but, cities!)

see FAS
April '85

or "econ recovery" (since Oct 80 - C!)

But - if Nure Wichter knocks out
city-busting esp. in retaliation (!) - i.e. "revenge
in kind"

what becomes of "minimum deterrence"? (McGB)

(though, if 10 cities provides this...
"OK"!)

At some time, city-busting = FS means
revenge ~~is~~ likely - even if suicidal

(that's where suicide is likely!

But also, city-busting
revenge = SS means
"third-strike, retal
on cities" certain

i.e. "you can't deter suicidal
retal in revenge!"

(? even though,
"probably suicidal"?)

Problem with "within-war deterrence":
miss attacks (either on cities or on

mil. forces) destroys the conditions
for "deterrence": (1) rational, deliberate, calc.

(2) focus on self-preservation
(vs. revenge, rel. advantage)
3) Control, ^{civil} pol. control

Hyp: The world after a few nuclear
explosions or small wars
will exhibit less "moral" or popular
restraints on the further use of nuclear
- because it will ^(may) no longer
feature real democracy in industrial
countries

(and the incentives to protest will
be greater;

- quasi-military rule
- desires for revenge
- denigration of adversaries
- discrediting of future
- no

This, that will be more credible
(despite proof(?))

And both nuclear, technology, and surveillance
(all favoring superpowers) will give an advantage.

Hyp: "Halliburton strategy" (annihilating threat/punish
for dissidents.)

- What do I mean by "FS" cap?

- HK really made the crucial distinction
rather than AJW (who "mystified".)

- Brodie + Viner observed, ^{this distinction on initial release of} by assuming "Type II" (i.e. SS
Cap.) soon, in 1945-46 - focusing on Type I

- at a time when monopoly existed, and only
Type II "was relevant for 15-20 years!"

("II" should be "I" - for US!)

It is SU that would AJW arise, with
emphasis on Type I:

Type II:

"to prevent war - or uprising."

^{by non-mass pressure}
^{or roll-back (Cuba) (Nik)}

(For US: to put down "uprisings - breakouts"

in an sphere - ^{since there} which could not be wholly
^{on global basis!} deterred - without arousing SU/CC enry!*

[SU could better aim at that, in the sphere:
to avert armed, violent, resistance: Jb
have - till Afghanistan!)

* ^{CC} SU encouragement / support; ^{VN; Cuba; Nik} large-scale support;
^{Korea} combat support (air); ^{Korea, VN} troops; have retailed ^{DBP} (Quinn)

Issue: US propensity (desire, contrary to
desires, values and expectations of "public")
to intervene in circumstances, and for purposes
& regions, that are "illegitimate,
aggressive, brutal, imperial, 'unnecessary',"

("Open Door in TW")

e.g. O.D. to US intervention)

Public accepts legit. of some US
interventions — "against SC aggression"

— to prevent [if feasible, at
acceptable cost + methods]

Spread of 'Communism'

(whether some 'misguided' locals want
it or not:)

and Adm tells public:

— some developments (^{ultra-}"nationalist",
will lead to Com later, 'socialist'...)

if allowed; and later, US intervention would be harder.

— US intervention is feasible if SC can be 'detained'
from intervening.

"Presenting spirit of 'Communism' is
= / the main expression of US attitude,
"our charity." .

(expresses an apprec. of "freedom"-
esp. of "econ choice,"
"private" enterprise

(and unobstructed access to foreign markets:
"doing well" by "doing good."